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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ERLING A. ROYLANCE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Ct. App. Case No.
860023-CA

vs.
LYNN B. ROWE, DEAN L. BRISTOW,
J.R. MONNAHAN, and MOUNTAIN
VIEW HOSPITAL,

Sup. Ct. Case No.
19928
Category 13

Defendants-Respondents.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS ROWE AND BRISTOW IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether Petitioner is entitled to review of the Utah Court
of Appeals decision to affirm the trial court holding to not
allow a res ipsa loquitur instruction to the jury?
DETERMINATIVE RULES
Rules 42-43, Rules of Utah Supreme Court, 56 Utah Adv. Rep.
38 (May 4, 1987).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is an action for medical malpractice arising out of
emergency surgery performed in June, 1981.

B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition by the Court of
Appeals.

This case was tried to a jury beginning December 27, 1983,
with the Honorable J. Robert Bullock presiding.

The jury

returned a special verdict wherein it found that neither
Dr. Rowe nor Dr. Bristow was negligent.
January 5, 1984.

Judgment was entered

A Motion for New Trial was filed, and Judge

Bullock denied the motion on April 16, 1984.

Plaintiff appealed

the trial court's decision to the Utah Supreme Court.

Plain-

t i f f s appeal was assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals, Case
No. 860023-CA, and set for hearing on April 27, 1987.
Appellant nor Respondents requested oral argument.

Neither

The Utah

Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court in an
opinion filed May 12, 1987.
Rep. 34 (Ct. App. 1987).
hereto as Appendix
C.

M

Roylance v. Rowe, 57 Utah Adv.

A copy of the opinion is attached

A."

Statement of the Facts.

The statement of facts set forth in plaintiff-appellant's
petition is substantially accurate.

There are, however,

several points that need to be clarified.
1.

On page 3 of plaintiffs petition it states that the

plaintiffs condition was determined on June 22, 1981.
fact, the condition was determined on June 12, 1981.
2.

In
(R. 474)

The plaintiff states on page 5 of his petition that

"Testimony offered from both plaintiff and defendants
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established that the better procedure would have been to strip
the plaintiff-patient and take more x-rays."

If fact, neither

Dr. Monnahan nor Dr. Bristow made these statements.
466, 519)

Rather, Dr. Monnahan said that additional x-rays may

have shown the location of the sponge.
3.

(See R.

(R. 461-62).

Further, on page 6 of plaintiffs petition, it is said

that M[t]he mere induction of additional anesthesia is potentially hazardous."
ment.

There are two problems with this state-

First, Mr. Roylance was already under an anesthesia and

reinduction was not necessary.
anesthetic.

(R. 527)

He was merely given additional

Secondly, there was no evidence intro-

duced at trial that the effect of such risk ever materialized
or resulted in injury or damage.
4.

Finally, on page 7 of the plaintiff's petition it

mentions that Mr. Roylance had an extended hospital stay and
developed post-operative bleeding from the colon.

Although

these facts are true, the record is devoid of any evidence
showing that these complications, or any of the complications,
were caused by the second operation.
In summary, plaintiff implies throughout his fact statement
that he suffered horrendous injuries because of the exploratory
surgery.

In fact, there was no believable or competent

testimony to prove that he suffered any injury.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Review by writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but
of judicial discretion.

The function of the Supreme Court is

to grant review of decisions where important issues of law
exist or serious error has occurred.
The plaintiff contends that the petition should be granted
because the trial court erred in not allowing a res ipsa
loquitur instruction to the jury.

The plaintiff's contention

is mistaken for at least three reasons.

Review by writ of

certiorari is inappropriate in the instant case because plaintiff has failed to satisfy any justification that the Court
will consider in granting such a writ.

In addition, the evi-

dence introduced by the plaintiff at trial clearly and completely delineated how the plaintiff's injuries occurred.

As a

result of such evidence, there was nothing left for the jury to
infer and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur had no application.

Finally, plaintiff improperly raises, for the first

time, the claim that defendants were negligent as a matter of
law.

-4-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
REVIEW BY WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS INAPPROPRIATE IN THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE PETITIONER
HAS FAILED TO SATISFY ANY JUSTIFICATION FOR
GRANTING SUCH A WRIT
Plaintiff seeks review by writ of certiorari.

Rule 43 of

the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court set forth the character of
reasons that will be considered in granting a review by writ of
certiorari.

See, Jurisdiction of Writ of Certiorari to Court

of Appeals, 56 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (May 4, 1987).

The pertinent

portions of Rule 43 provide:
(1) when a panel of the court of appeals has
rendered a decision in conflict with a decision of
another panel of the court of appeals on the same
issue of law;
(2) when a panel of the court of appeals has
decided a question of state or federal law in a way
that is in conflict with a decision of this court;
(3) when a panel of the court of appeals has
rendered a decision that has so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceeding or
has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower
court as to call for an exercise of this court's power
of supervision; or
(4) when the court of appeals has decided an
important question of municipal, state or federal law
which has not been, but should be, settled by this
court.
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that
"certiorari is a discretionary writ."

-5-

Boggess v. Morris, 635

P.2d 39, 42 (Utah 1981).

See also, Rohwer v. District Court,

41 Utah 279, 293, 125 P. 671 (1912).

In discussing the

exercise of such discretion, this Court noted:
[t]hat discretion must be used sparingly so as not to
undermine legislative authorizations fixing limits on
the time and manner of appellate review.
Boggess, 635 P.2d at 42.
The function of the Supreme Court, as outlined in the subsections of Rule 43, is to grant review only where substantial
issues of law exist or serious error has occurred.

See Mast v.

Standard Oil Co. of California, 140 Ariz. 1, 680 P.2d 137, 138
(1984).

Faced with a similar Petition for Writ of Certiorari,

the Oregon Supreme Court helped clarify the role of a Supreme
Court working in connection with a Court of Appeals.

In 1000

Friends of Oregon v. Board of County Commissioners, Etc., 584
P.2d 1371, 1372 (Ore. 1978), the Court held that:
[t]he function of this Supreme Court is no longer to
afford every losing litigant a forum to review errors
said to have been committed at trial or in an administrative hearing. That function is now placed in the
Court of Appeals. Similarly, a party asserting that
the Court of Appeals, in turn, has erred cannot for
that reason alone expect further review in this court.
The process must stop somewhere, and for most purposes
this is at the first level of appeal. (Emphasis added)
Much like this Court, Oregon has not set forth a set of
criteria entitling a petitioner to review as of right, but
rather, has required a petitioner to "present concrete reasons
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why the importance of an issue transcends the importance of the
case to the litigants-"

16. at 1373.

Plaintiff's petition fails to "present any concrete reason"
why the issues in this case "transcend the importance of the
case to the litigants" and should be subject to further review.
POINT II
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR DOES NOT
APPLY TO THE FACTS IN THIS CASE,
Respondents do not dispute that res ipsa loquitur is an
established legal principle in Utah.

Given the proper facts

and the proper testimony, a jury should be so instructed.

This

case does not present either the requisite facts or the
requisite testimony.
The facts of this case do not present a res ipsa loquitur
situation.

The historic reason for the development of the

doctrine was to provide a means by which a plaintiff, who did
not have access to the information necessary to prove actual
negligence, could present a prima facie case.

In fact, Mr.

Roylance did present a successful prima facie case.

The theory

of negligence against the doctors was that they should have
taken more x-rays before doing further surgery.

The case was

submitted to the jury on that specific theory of negligence.
The jury just did not believe that the doctors were negligent.
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It is paradoxical that appellant, having gone to great
lengths at the trial to attempt to prove that Dr. Bristow and
Dr. Rowe were negligent with regard to very specific activities, would then attempt to show that he did not have the
information or ability within his control to present that
evidence.

In fact, Judge Bullock must, of necessity, have

found that he presented a prima facie case, or the issue would
not have been submitted to the jury.
The Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion.

The

court held as follows:
In this case, there is no dispute that the
injury, the unnecessary second surgery, was caused by
the defendant doctors. The doctors do not deny that a
second surgery was performed to remove what appeared
to be a sponge left inside the defendant; they do not
deny that this surgery was performed following a correct sponge count but after a suspicious x-ray; they
do not deny that the subsequent operation failed to
locate any sponge or gauze. Inasmuch as the evidence
introduced by Roylance clearly and completely delineated how Roylance's injuries occurred, the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur has no application, as there is
nothing left to infer. The jury was only required to
determine if this conduct breached the requisite
standard of care. The court therefore did not err in
refusing to give Roylance*s proposed instruction on
res ipsa loquitur.
Roylance v. Rowe, 57 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, slip op. at 4 (Ut. App.
1987).
Secondly, the appellant did not plead the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur in his Complaint (R. 5-7). The issue was not
raised at the pretrial conference (R. 167).

-8-

It was first

raised at the conclusion of the evidence with a discussion of
the proposed Jury Instructions took place (R. 802). In one of
the early Utah cases dealing with res ipsa loquitur, the
Supreme Court said:
[W]e think one who wishes to rely on that [res ipsa
loquitur] doctrine, as well as specifically assigned
acts of negligence, must so plead, either by a separate count or by proper allegation to the effect that
the negligence to be inferred from the general situation caused the injury, thereby notifying the other
party that he intends to rely on the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur. To set out by way of inducement a
situation which itself may bespeak a prima facie case
of negligence and then follow with allegations of
specific negligence and allege by "by reason of such
negligent acts and omissions on the part of the
defendant the plaintiff was injured," etc., does not
sufficiently put the defendant on notice that the
plaintiff is going to rely on the situation itself to
furnish any inference of negligence.
Loos v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 99 Utah 496, 108 P.2d 254 at
295 (1940).

Clearly, the appellant did not put the respondents

or the court on notice of his intent to rely on res ipsa
loquitur.
Finally, it is the contention of respondents that the
plaintiff did not meet the burden of proving the first element
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur:

"That the accident was

of a kind which, in the ordinary course of events, would not
have happened had due care been observed."

As early as 1934,

the Utah Supreme Court has implied that in medical malpractice
cases the plaintiff must produce expert testimony to prove that
specific element of res ipsa loquitur.
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Pussey v. Budge, 85

Utah 37, 38 P.2d 712, 715 (1934).

This certainly seems logical

in light of this Court's ruling in numerous malpractice cases
wherein it has said that standards of care must be established
by expert medical testimony*

See, e.g., Huggins v. Hicken, 6

Utah 2d 233, 310 P.2d 523 (1957).
The arguments advanced in this case are precisely the same
as were before the Court in Joseph v. W.H. Grave Latter-Day
Saints Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94, 348 P.2d 935 (1960).

The plain-

tiff in that case had failed to plead res ipsa loquitur.

He

had proceeded to trial claiming specific acts of negligence.
He then urged that the case be submitted to jury with an
instruction on res ipsa loquitur.

The trial court denied his

request and the jury returned a defense verdict.
On appeal, the Supreme Court said it did not even need to
address the first two issues —

and moved on to decide whether

the evidence justified submitting the case on the theory of res
ipsa loquitur.

In affirming the lower court decision, the

Court said:
It is realized that res ipsa loquitur has been applied
in various fields where an injury occurs which is not
to be expected if proper standards of care and skill
are observed. But this is done only with caution, particularly in the medical field because of the realization that many aspect of the treatment of human ills
cannot yet be regarded as exact science and a bad
result may result even though recognized standards of
care and skill are employed.
Id. at 938.
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The facts in the present case do not present a legally
sufficient basis for submission on the theory of res ipsa
loquitur.

Further, by failing to plead the theory, and by then

proceeding to "successfully" present a prima facie case for
specific acts of negligence the appellant was estopped from
asserting the theory.

The trial court properly instructed the

jury and the case was properly affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
POINT III
THIS COURT WILL NOT CONSIDER AN ISSUE NOT
RAISED IN THE PLEADINGS OR IN THE TRIAL COURT
The Utah Supreme Court has held in various cases that an
issue not raised in the pleadings or at the trial court cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal.

Insley Mfg. Corp. v.

Draper Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1347 (Utah 1986); Madsen v.
Brown, 701 P.2d 1086, 1088 (Utah 1985); Duckett v. Olsen, 699
P.2d 734, 737 (Utah 1985).

Issues which are "neither raised in

the pleadings nor put in issue at the trial cannot be considered
for the first time on appeal."

Bundy v. Century Equipment Co.,

692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984); Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d
1320, 1322-23 (Utah 1982); Park City, Utah Corp. v. Ensign Co.,
586 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1978).

"Issues not presented to the

trial court for decision are not reviewable by this court, and
we express no opinion on the issue."
P.2d 856, 857 (Utah 1984) .
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Trayner v. Cushing, 688

Petitioner claims that the defendants were negligent as a
matter of law.

(Petition at p. 14). This claim is raised for

the first time in this petition.

Under these circumstances,

*[i]t is axiomatic that defenses and claims not raised by the
parties in the trial cannot be considered for the first time on
appeal.-

Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983).

Furthermore, petitioner fails to cite authority to support
this claim.
CONCLUSION
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right,
but of judicial discretion.

The petitioner has failed to show

that the issue decided by the Court of Appeals was of substantial importance or that the decision of the Court of Appeals is
in conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of
Appeals or with a decision of this Court.

Thus, the plaintiff-

appellant's petition should be denied.
Respectfully submitted this j2JL*/day of June, 1987.

jgle

Attorney for Def^^n^ants-Respondents
Rowe and Bristow
SCMDWS10
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Erling A. Roylance,
Plaintiff and Appellant/
OPINION
(For Publication)

v.
Lynn B. Rowe, Dean L. Bristow,
J. R. Monnahan, and Mountain
View Hospital/

Case No. 860023-CA

Defendants and Respondents.
Before Judges Billings/ Garff and Jackson

FILED
MAY! 21987
Timothy M. Shea
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals

BILLINGS/ Judge:

Plaintiff Roylance brought an action against Doctors Rowe
and Bristow, and Mountain View Hospital for medical malpractice
arising from surgery performed in June, 1981. At the
conclusion of Roylance1s case-in-chief, defendant Mountain View
Hospital was dismissed. Subsequently, the jury found the
remaining two doctor defendants not negligent and judgment was
entered in favor of defendants, no cause of action. Roylance
seeks reversal claiming the trial court erred (a) in not
granting a directed verdict in favor of plaintiff and in
failing to allow a new trial based upon the weight of the
evidence; (b) in denying plaintiffs requested jury instruction
on res ipsa loquitur; and (c) in failing to dismiss defendant
hospital at the commencement of trial. We affirm.
Roylance entered Mountain View Hospital for removal of an
acute gangrenous perforated gallbl adder. The emergency surgery
was performed by Drs. Rowe and Bri stow. Following the surgery,
the scrub nurse counted the sponge s; the figures totaled and
matched the initial count. After the doctors closed Roylance's
incision, an x-ray was taken which revealed the presence of a
4 M x 4" piece of gauze. The doctors checked Roylance's
external bandages and bed clothes and finding nothing,
determined a sponge had been left internally. The doctors
thereafter performed another opera tion to locate the sponge or
gauze; no sponge or gauze was loca ted. This action was brought

APPENDIX

against Drs. Rowe and Bristow and Mountain View Hospital on
grounds that Roylance was subjected to unnecessary surgery.
Following a pre-trial settlement and release of Mountain
View Hospital, Roylance unsuccessfully moved to dismiss
Mountain View Hospital, The court, however, dismissed the
hospital at the conclusion of Roylance's case-in-chief and
directed a verdict in the hospital's favor. At the conclusion
of the trial against the remaining two doctors, the court
denied Roylance's requested jury instruction on res ipsa
loquitur but submitted the issue of the defendants' negligence
to the jury. The jury found the doctors were not negligent.
The court then denied Roylance's motion for a new trial.
I.
Roylance tirst contends there was insufficient evidence to
justify the jury's verdict of no cause of action on negligence
and, therefore, the trial court erred in failing to grant
Roylance's motion for a new trial. The law on this point is
well established. Where the trial court has denied a motion
for a new trial based upon insufficiency of evidence to justify
the verdict, its decision will be sustained on appeal if there
was an evidentiary basis for the jury's decision. The trial
court's denial of the motion will be reversed only if the
evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or so
slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly
unreasonable and unjust. Nelson v. Truiillo. 657 P.2d 730, 732
(Utah 1982); S3JS. Hall v. Anderson, 562 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1977).
The trial record contains ample evidence to support the
jury's finding that the doctors were not negligent. We do not
find the evidence supporting the jury's finding so lacking or
unconvincing as to make the verdict unreasonable or unjust.
II.
Roylance next contends the trial court erred in failing to
give the jury an instruction on res ipsa loquitur. Res ipsa
loquitur is an evidentiary doctrine aiding in the proof of
negligence. Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828, 834 (Utah
1980). The purpose of res ipsa loquitur is
to permit one who suffers injury from
something under the control of another,
which ordinarily would not cause injury
except for the other's negligence, to
present his grievance to a court or jury
on the basis that an inference of
negligence may reasonably be drawn from
such facts; and cast the burden upon the
other to make proof of what happened.

860023-CA
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2£. at 833 (emphasis added) (citing Lund v. Phillips Petroleum
£ Q . , 10 Utah 2d 276, 351 P.2d 952 (1960); £££ also Joseph v. W,
H. Groves Latter Dav Saint Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94, 348 P.2d
935 (1960); White v Pinnev. 99 Utah 484, 108 P.2d 249 (1940).
A res ipsa loquitur instruction is appropriate where a
plaintiff is unable to pinpoint which act or omission on the
part of a defendant breached a legally imposed standard of
care.1
Before being entitled to such a jury instruction, however,
a plaintiff must show:
(1) [T]hat the accident was of a kind
which, in the ordinary course of events,
would not have happened had due care been
observed; (2) that the plaintiff's own
use or operation of the agency or
instrumentality was not primarily
responsible for the injury; and (3) that
the agency or instrumentality causing the
injury was under the exclusive management
or control of the defendant.
Kusv v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp.. 681 P.2d 1232, 1235 (Utah
1984) (citing Anderton, 607 P.2d at 833).
Application of res ipsa loquitur is, however, premised on
the plaintiffs inability to produce evidence identifying the
precise negligent act or omission on the part of a defendant
which caused the harm. There is no room for the operation of
res ipsa loquitur where the evidence in the case reveals all of
the facts and circumstances of the occurrence and clearly
establishes the precise allegedly negligent act which is the
cause of plaintiff's injury. See Kusv v. K-Mart Apparel
Fashion Corp., 681 P.2d 1232# 1236 (Utah 1984). See also
Crawford v. Rogers. 406 P.2d 189, 193 (Alaska 1965); Ballhorst
v. Hahner-Forman-Cale, Inc.. 207 Kan. 89, 99, 484 P.2d 38, 46
(1971); Hugo v. Manning. 201 Kan. 391, 395-98, 441 P.2d 145,
149-51 (1968); Dabroe v. Rhodes Co., 64 Wash. 431, 392 P.2d
317, 322 (1964).
This does not mean that introduction of evidence of
specific acts of negligence deprives a plaintiff of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. This jurisdiction has long held
1. Although in the majority of medical malpractice cases, the
plaintiff must introduce expert testimony to establish the
standard of care, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized certain
situations where expert testimony is unnecessary. Nixdorf v.
Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980). We do not reach the
issue in this case.
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that a case presented to the jury on specific theories of
negligence does not preclude an instruction on a theory of res
ipsa loquitur. Anaerman Co. v. Edoemon. 76 Utah 394, 400, 290
P. 169# 172 (1930). Rather, the rule may be summarized as
follows: Where the three conditions for application of res
ipsa loquitur have been established, a mere prima facia showing
of specific negligence does not prevent its use. Under such
circumstances the case should be submitted on both the theory
of specific negligence and res ipsa loquitur. Thus, if proof
by a plaintiff of specific acts of negligence on the
defendants part does not furnish a complete explanation of the
accident, as where there are alternative theories of
negligence, there is still room for an inference of negligence
arising from the happening of the accident. Where, however,
proof of specific negligence goes so far as to reveal all the
facts and circumstances and fully explain the alleged negligent
cause of injury by positive evidence, res ipsa loquitur has no
function. Kusy, 681 P.2d at 1236.
In the case before us, Roylance argues that the second,
unnecessary surgery was an accident which would not have
happened had due care been observed, that Roylance was not
responsible for the injury, and that the instrumentality
causing the injury was under the exclusive control of the
defendant doctors. Roylance concludes that, inasmuch as the
three conditions of res ipsa loquitur have been satisfied, the
court should have instructed on the doctrine. As the foregoing
discussion makes clear, however, our analysis must not end.
The issue remains whether at trial Roylance offered evidence of
specific negligence so as to fully explain the alleged
negligent cause of injury. If the evidence received at trial
fully revealed all of the facts and circumstances surrounding
the accident, res ipsa loquitur has no application.
In this case, there is no dispute that the injury, the
unnecessary second surgery, was caused by the defendant
doctors. The doctors do not deny that a second surgery was
performed to remove what appeared to be a sponge left inside
the defendant; they do not deny that this surgery was performed
following a correct sponge count but after a suspicious x-ray;
they do not deny that the subsequent operation failed to locate
any sponge or gauze. Inasmuch as the evidence introduced by
Roylance clearly and completely delineated how Roylance's
injuries occurred, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has no
application, as there is nothing left to infer. The jury was
only required to determine if this conduct breached the
requisite standard of care. The court therefore did not err in
refusing to give Roylance's proposed instruction on res ipsa
loquitur. In view of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to
consider the other points raised by respondents.
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III.
Finally# Roylance contends the trial court erred in failing
to dismiss defendant hospital at the commencement of trial.
Prior to the commencement of trial, Roylance entered into a
settlement agreement with defendant Mountain View Hospital
relieving the hospital from liability to make contribution to
the doctors pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-43 (1977).2
Roylance moved to dismiss defendant Mountain View Hospital;
defendant doctors argued that under § 78-27-43 Mountain View
Hospital could not be dismissed from the action until the issue
of proportionate fault had been litigated. The court denied
Roylance1s motion and compelled Mountain View Hospital
to
remain a defendant until the completion of Roylance9s case.
The pertinent section of the Utah Code provides:
(1) A release by the injured person of one
joint tort-feasor does not relieve him
from liability to make contribution to
another joint tort-feasor unless that
release:
(a) Is given before the right of the
other tort-feasor to secure a money
judgment for contribution has
accrued; and
(b) Provides for a reduction, to the
extent of the prorata share of the
released tort-feasor, of the injured
person's damages recoverable against
all the other tort-feasors.
(2) This section shall apply only if the
issue of proportionate fault is litigated
between joint tort-feasors in the same
action.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-43 (1977).
Roylance could relieve defendant Mountain View Hospital
from liability for contribution only under the express
provisions of § 78-27-43. Madsen v. Salt Lake Citv School Bd.,
645 P.2d 658, 663 (Utah 1982); £££ Thode, Comparative
Negligence, Contribution Among Tort-Feasors, and the Effect of
2. This case was decided prior to the 1986 modification of
provisions relating to comparative negligence which, among
other things, abolished joint and several liability and rights
of contribution among joint tort-feasors. Utah Code Ann.
§§ 78-27-38 to -43 (1986).
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a Release—A Triple Plav bv the Utah Legislature, 1973 Utah L.
Rev. 406, 431-33. As noted, this section specifically states
that it shall apply only if proportionate fault is litigated
between joint tort-feasors in the same action, as only then can
the plaintiff$s judgment be proportionately reduced by the
released tort-feasor*s established fault.
Roylance cannot claim the benefits of § 78-27-43 to release
Mountain View Hospital from liability to make contribution and
at the same time deny defendant doctors the right to litigate
the hospital's proportionate fault. The trial court did not
err in denying Roylancefs motion to dismiss Mountain View
Hospital at the commencement of trial.
Judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
respondent.

Judith M. Billings, Judge

WE CONCUR:

R. W. Garff, Judge

Norman H. Jackson, Judge
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